Inside the Black Box: Organisational Buying Behaviour and Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare: A Response to Recent Commentary by Sanderson, Joe et al.
Inside the Black Box: Organisational Buying Behaviour 
and Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare: A Response to 
Recent Commentary
Joe Sanderson1* ID , Chris Lonsdale1, Russell Mannion2 ID  
Correspondence
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2019, 8(11), 675–677 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2019.70
*Correspondence to: Joe Sanderson, Email: j.r.sanderson@bham.ac.uk
Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical 
Sciences. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Citation: Sanderson J, Lonsdale C, Mannion R. Inside the black box: 
organisational buying behaviour and strategic purchasing in healthcare: a 
response to recent commentary. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2019;8(11):675–677. 
doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2019.70
Received: 7 August 2019; Accepted: 17 August 2019; ePublished: 7 September 2019
Introduction
We read the Hanson et al1 paper with great interest, utilising as 
it does our IJHPM paper, ‘What’s Needed to Develop Strategic 
Purchasing in Healthcare? Policy Lessons from a Realist 
Review.’2 We very much agree with their statement identifying 
a key gap in our paper: ‘One empirical finding which is not 
directly anticipated in either the economics of organisation 
or the inter-organisational relationships literatures was the 
critical importance of organisational capacity. Strategic 
purchasing is technically demanding and requires a number 
of capacities of the purchaser.’1 The realist review from which 
our paper was derived included the issue of organisational 
capacity as a key aspect of strategic purchasing. Limitations 
of space prevented us from discussing it in the paper, but this 
correspondence provides an ideal opportunity to do so, albeit 
briefly.
Much of the procurement literature concerns buyer-
supplier interactions, with principal-agent, transaction cost 
and inter-organisational relationships theories centre-stage. 
This was covered in our recent paper.2 However, there is 
also a complementary part of the literature that concerns 
‘organisational buying behaviour’ (OBB) – research into 
the structures, cultures, systems, processes, capabilities and 
behaviours (that together create organisational capacity) 
that affect whether the buy-side organisation can manage 
its interactions with suppliers effectively. In what follows, we 
look at three key aspects of the OBB literature and illustrate 
their relevance to strategic purchasing via an application to 
English National Health Service (NHS) commissioning.
Organisational Buying Behaviour and Strategic Purchasing
Procurement Set-up 
There is a long-running debate within the procurement 
literature regarding how procurement activity should be 
organised. Two key issues concern the degree of centralisation 
of procurement3 and a related, although not synonymous, 
issue of the appropriate level of purchasing aggregation.4 The 
former issue has been the focus of much policy in the NHS 
regarding medical supplies, with many re-organisations at 
both a regional and national level. 
More pertinent to NHS commissioning, however, is the 
issue of aggregation. There has been continual change in 
the size/patient coverage of commissioning bodies since the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split in 1990. Initially, 
there was a policy of general practitioner (GP) fundholding, 
with 57% of GPs involved at the time of its abolition in 1998.5 
GP fund-holders were replaced in 1998 by 481 primary care 
groups (PCGs),6 in turn replaced by 303 primary care trusts 
(PCTs),7 which were reduced to 151,8 then replaced by 212 
clinical commissioning groups (CCGs),8 which are now due 
to be dramatically reduced in number to map better onto the 
integrated care systems developed as part of the reversal of the 
Lansley reforms of 2012.9
Familiar themes common within the OBB literature3 have 
been cited by NHS personnel in favour of different levels of 
aggregation. On the one hand, concerns have been expressed 
about a too high a level of aggregation. For example, Julie 
Wood, chief executive of NHS Clinical Commissioners, 
commented recently: ‘Clinical commissioners want to stay 
connected to their constituent places and for their systems to 
make sense for the populations they serve, which means it’s 
likely that the future number of CCGs to be more than the 
current 44 sustainability and transformation partnerships.’9 
On the other hand, there has also been talk of the benefits 
of scale, in particular consistency, efficiency and buying 
power. For example, with respect to the merger of eight CCGs 
in London, it was claimed that the newer bigger entity would 
end ‘any suggestion of a postcode lottery by making services 
equitable across the eight boroughs’ and that financial savings 
would ‘come from reducing duplication.’10 The creation of 
PCTs to replace the larger number of PCGs was accompanied 
by the language of power, as PCTs were expected to negotiate 
effectively with hospital trusts.11 
The NHS is, of course, not the only organisation to 
have struggled to find the right balance between levels of 
centralisation and aggregation, with swings between opposites 
commonplace.3 Its high political profile, however, does seem 
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to make it hard for politicians to heed the commonly-heard 
refrain of ‘no more top-down re-organisations.’
Procurement Capability and Information
While the issue of procurement set-up is important – 
structures matter – it has been hard to judge whether any 
particular structural arrangements for commissioning over 
the past three decades were optimal (or indeed whether 
the purchaser-provider split was a good idea), as no NHS 
commissioning organisation has been given sufficient time to 
be properly established. This lack of time is one important 
reason why NHS commissioning organisations have fallen 
short of reaching the required level and quality of capabilities 
and information suggested by the OBB literature.
In terms of capabilities, effective procurement requires 
effective leadership within the procurement function12; high-
quality procurement personnel, with different skill sets13 
and an appropriate level of rotation14; and, developed team-
working skills, both on the part of those in the procurement 
function and those outside it who provide input into the 
procurement process.15 
In terms of information, there is a need for an effective buying 
organisation to develop accurate and usable information 
about the profile of the organisation’s demand. This is 
obvious, of course, but difficult for reasons of uncertainty, 
complexity and the vagaries of IT systems and their usage.16,17 
There is also a need for accurate information on the often 
myriad supply markets a buying organisation interacts with. 
This is not just regarding the availability of suppliers, but also 
their capability18 and the level of bargaining power the buying 
organisation possesses relative to suppliers.19
The failure of NHS commissioners in this respect was 
outlined by the House of Commons Health Committee in 
2010. A key conclusion of the report, which reflected on the 
performance of PCGs and PCTs between 1998 and 2010, was 
squarely about capabilities and management information: 
‘Weaknesses are due in large part to PCTs’ lack of skills, 
notably poor analysis of data, lack of clinical knowledge and 
the poor quality of much PCT management. The situation 
has been made worse by the constant re-organisations and 
high turnover of staff.’20 This poor OBB was said to have 
consequences: ‘[R]ecent NAO value for money reports … 
highlighted weaknesses at PCT level in all three stages of the 
commissioning cycle: strategic planning, procuring services 
and monitoring and evaluation.’20
Procurement Politics and Governance
A third aspect of the OBB literature concerns cross-functional 
co-operation (or lack of it) and procurement governance. 
It has, of course, been widely argued that organisations are 
affected by power and politics.21 It has also been noted that the 
procurement process within organisations is not exempt from 
this.4 Commercial and non-commercial managers within 
procuring organisations can disagree over the priorities and 
specifics of a procurement exercise, leading to demand-side 
problems such as product or service over-specification and 
poor service scoping.22 Such disagreement can also lead to 
problems with ‘procurement governance’ in the negotiation 
and contract management stages of the process – that is, either 
confusion or disagreement of over the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities.23 Various responses to this, especially 
stakeholder engagement, have been suggested to address the 
conflicts and problems.12
The dynamics of power and politics have affected NHS 
commissioning. For example, Vize7 commented on the 
operation of PCTs: ‘In theory, clinicians were well represented 
on the commissioning side … But too often there was a 
distant, or even antagonistic, relationship between local GPs 
and PCT management. This failure to bring an authentic 
clinical voice to PCT strategies made it more difficult for 
commissioners to engage clinical staff in the trusts.’ A major 
hope for the replacement CCGs was that these relationships 
would be better. In that spirit, David Smith, a chief officer 
in a CCG, provided advice to CCGs regarding stakeholder 
engagement: ‘If you really want to be effective locally you 
must understand how your local authority works and you 
must put time and energy into cultivating these relationships 
… CCGs will also need to acquaint themselves with the local 
arrangements for health scrutiny …[G]et to know the chair of 
their health scrutiny committee, understand their concerns 
and agree how they are going to work with them.’24 
Conclusions: Taking OBB Seriously at an Organisational and 
Policy-Level
Much of the OBB literature is focused at the organisation-
level and this work resonates with the experience of NHS 
commissioning organisations over the past 20 years. However, 
as the brief discussion above shows, there is also a need 
for the lessons of the OBB literature to be understood and 
applied at a policy-level. There were always reasons related 
to the structure of the secondary care sector for believing 
that the NHS purchaser-provider split would struggle to 
provide the improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
expected in government and think-tanks. However, there is 
little doubt that the limited achievements of the policy have 
been exacerbated by the fact that at no stage over the past 
three decades has any UK government taken the lessons of 
OBB seriously. As Hanson et al1 were correct to point out, 
such lessons are as important as the guidance provided by 
the economics of organisation and inter-organisational 
relationships literatures, and they need to be given equal 
weight in understanding what’s needed to develop successful 
strategic purchasing in healthcare.
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